We propose a novel privacy-preserving support vector machine (SVM) classifier for a data matrix A whose input feature columns are divided into groups belonging to different entities. Each entity is unwilling to share its group of columns or make it public. Our classifier is based on the concept of a reduced kernel K (A, B ), where B is the transpose of a random matrix B. The column blocks of B corresponding to the different entities are privately generated by each entity and never made public. The proposed linear or nonlinear SVM classifier, which is public but does not reveal any of the privately held data, has accuracy comparable to that of an ordinary SVM classifier that uses the entire set of input features directly.
INTRODUCTION
Recently there has been wide interest in privacy-preserving support vector machine (SVM) classifiers. Basically the problem revolves around generating a classifier based on data, parts of which are held by private entities; these entities, for various reasons, are unwilling to make their part of the data public. When each entity holds its own group of input feature values for all individuals while other entities hold other groups of feature values for the same individuals, the data is referred to as vertically partitioned. This is so because feature values are represented by columns of a data matrix, while individuals are represented by rows of the data matrix. Privacy-preserving associations for vertically partitioned data were first proposed in Vaidya and Clifton [2002] . In , privacy-preserving SVM classifiers were obtained for vertically partitioned data by adding random perturbations to the data. In Xiao et al. [2005] and , horizontally partitioned privacy-preserving SVMs and induction tree classifiers were obtained for data where different entities hold the same input features for different groups of individuals. In Liu et al. [2006] multiplicative data perturbation was utilized for privacy-preserving data mining. Other privacy-preserving classifying techniques include cryptographically private SVMs [Laur et al. 2006] , wavelet-based distortion [Liu et al. 2007] , and rotation perturbation [Chen and Liu 2005] . A privacy-preserving decision tree for multiple entities is described in Suthampan and Maneewongvatana [2005] and an algebraic-based technique is proposed in Zhang et al. [2005] . In Zhan et al. [2008] a naive Bayesian procedure is employed for horizontally partitioned data, while Ge et al. [2005] utilize a transition probability matrix and decision trees for privacy-preserving classification and Yang et al. [2005] introduce cryptographic data-mining techniques.
In this work we propose a highly efficient privacy-preserving SVM (PPSVM) classifier for vertically partitioned data that is different from existing SVM classifiers and is based on the following two ideas. For a given data matrix A ∈ R m×n , instead of using the usual kernel function K (A, A ) : R m×n × R n×m −→ R m×m , we use a reduced kernel [Lee and Mangasarian 2001; Lee and Huang 2007 ] K (A, B ) : R m×n × R n×m −→ R m×m ,m < m, where B is a completely random matrix. The second idea is that them columns of the random matrix B ∈ Rm ×n are privately generated in p blocks corresponding to the p entities holding the p blocks of input features. Each random column block of the matrix B is generated by only one of the p entities, and this block of the random B is known only to the entity that generated it and never made public. By employing these two ideas, we shall describe an algorithm that completely protects the privacy of each vertical partition of the data matrix A, owned by a distinct entity, while generating an SVM classifier with tenfold cross-validation accuracy comparable to that of an ordinary SVM classifier that utilizes the whole data in one shot.
We now briefly describe the contents of the article. In Section 2 we describe our method for a privacy-protecting linear SVM classifier for vertically partitioned data, and in Section 3 we do the same for a nonlinear SVM classifier. In Section 4 we give computational results that show the effectiveness of our approach, including correctness that is comparable to ordinary SVMs. Section 5 concludes the article with a summary and some ideas for future work.
We describe our notation now. All vectors will be column vectors unless transposed to a row vector by a prime . For a vector x ∈ R n the notation x j will signify either the j th component or j th block of components. The scalar (inner) product of two vectors x and y in the n-dimensional real space R n will be denoted by x y. For x ∈ R n , x 1 denotes the 1-norm (
The notation A ∈ R m×n will signify a real m × n matrix. For such a matrix, A will denote the transpose of A, A i will denote the ith row or ith block of rows of A, and A · j the j th column or the j th block of columns of A. A vector of ones in a real space of arbitrary dimension will be denoted by e. Thus, for e ∈ R m and y ∈ R m the notation e y will denote the sum of the components of y. A vector of zeros in a real space of arbitrary dimension will be denoted by 0. For A ∈ R m×n and B ∈ R k×n , a kernel K (A, B ) maps R m×n × R n×k into R m×k . In particular, if x and y are column vectors in R n , then K (x , y) is a real number, K (x , B ) is a row vector in R k , and K (A, B ) is an m × k matrix. The base of the natural logarithm will be denoted by ε. A frequently used kernel in nonlinear classification is the Gaussian kernel [Vapnik 2000; Schölkopf and Smola 2002; Mangasarian 2000] 
, and μ is a positive constant. We shall not assume that our kernels satisfy Mercer's positive definiteness condition [Vapnik 2000; Schölkopf and Smola 2002; Cristianini and Shawe-Taylor 2000] ; however, we shall assume that they are separable in the following sense that
where the symbol denotes the Hadamard componentwise product of two matrices of the same dimensions [Horn and Johnson 1985] , E ∈ R m×n 1 , F ∈ R m×n 2 , G ∈ R k×n 1 , and H ∈ R k×n 2 . It is straightforward to show that a linear kernel K (A, B ) = AB satisfies Eq. (1) with the + sign, and a Gaussian kernel satisfies (1) with the sign. Separability can also be extended to polynomial kernels, such as
where μ is an arbitrary scalar and a and b are arbitrary vectors, and we have employed the MATLAB "dot" notation [MATLAB 2006 ] to signify application of a function to each component of a matrix or a vector. For example, if A ∈ R m×n , then A 2 • ∈ R m×n will denote the matrix of elements of A squared. Note that the polynomial kernels are separable because they can be formed componentwise from the linear kernel by each entity. Using a kernel that satisfies (1) or (2) ensures that each entity can compute a portion of the kernel matrix using only its own features, and then portions from different entities can be combined to compute the full kernel matrix. Kernels which require that entities have access to other entities' features to compute the kernel are not separable, and cannot be used in the approach described next. The abbreviation "s.t." stands for "subject to".
PRIVACY-PRESERVING LINEAR CLASSIFIER FOR VERTICALLY PARTITIONED DATA
The dataset that we wish to obtain a classifier for consists of m points in R n represented by the m rows of the matrix A ∈ R m×n . The matrix A is divided into p vertical blocks of n 1 , n 2 , . . . . . . and n p columns with n 1 + n 2 + . . .+ n p = n. Each block of columns is "owned" by an entity that is unwilling to make it public or share it with the other entities. Furthermore, each row of A is labeled as belonging to the class +1 or −1 by a corresponding diagonal matrix D ∈ R m×m of ±1's. The linear kernel classifier to be generated based on this data will be a separating plane in R n , as
which classifies a given point x according to the sign of x w − γ . Here, w = B u, w ∈ R n is the normal to the plane x w − γ = 0, γ ∈ R determines the distance of the plane from the origin in R n , and B is a random matrix in R k×n . The change of variables w = B u is employed in order to kernelize the data and is motivated by the fact that when B = A and hence w = A u, the variable u is the dual variable for a 2-norm SVM [Mangasarian 2000 ]. The variables u ∈ R k and γ ∈ R are to be determined by an optimization problem such that the labeled data A satisfies, to the extent possible, the separation condition
This condition (4) places the +1 and −1 points represented by A on opposite sides of the separating plane (3). In general, the matrix B, which determines a transformation of variables w = B u, is set equal to A. However, in reduced support vector machines [Lee and Mangasarian 2001; Huang and Lee 2004] B =Ā, whereĀ is a submatrix of A whose rows are a small subset of the rows of A. In fact, B can be a random matrix in Rm ×n with n ≤m ≤ m if m ≥ n andm = m if m ≤ n. This random choice of B holds the key to our privacy-preserving classifier and has been used effectively in SVM classification problems [Mangasarian and Thompson 2006] . Our computational results of Section 4 will show that there is no essential difference between using a random B or a random submatrix ofĀ of the rows of A as in reduced SVMs [Lee and Mangasarian 2001; Lee and Huang 2007] . One justification for these similar results can be given for the case whenm ≥ n and the rank of the m × n matrix B is n. For such a case, when B is replaced by A in (4), this results in a regular linear SVM formulation with a solution, say v ∈ R m . In this case , the reduced SVM formulation (4) can match the regular SVM term AA v by the term AB u, since B u = A v has a solution u for any v because B has rank n. We shall now partition the random matrix B into p column blocks with each column block belonging to one of the p entities held privately by it and never made public. [Bennett and Demiriz 1998; Fung and Mangasarian 2001b] . We leave this to future work.) (II) Each entity generates its own privately held random matrix B · j ∈ Rm ×n j , j = 1, . . . . . . , p, where n j is the number of features held by entity j . (III) Each entity j makes public its linear kernel A · j B · j . This does not reveal A · j but allows the public computation of the full linear kernel:
(IV) A publicly calculated linear classifier x Bu − γ = 0 is computed by some standard method such as 1-norm SVM [Mangasarian 2000; Bradley and Mangasarian 1998 ]: min (u,γ , y) ν
(V) For each new x ∈ R n , each entity makes public x j B · j from which a public linear classifier is computed as follows:
which classifies the given x according to the sign of x Bu − γ .
Thus we have
We are ready to state our algorithm which will provide a linear classifier for the data without revealing privately held data blocks
The accuracy of this algorithm will be comparable to that of a linear SVM using a publicly available A instead of merely
Remark 2.2. Note that in the preceding algorithm no entity j reveals its dataset A · j nor its components of a new data point x j . This is so because it is impossible to compute the mn j numbers constituting A · j ∈ R m×n j given only the mm numbers constituting (A · j B · j ) ∈ R m×m and not even knowing B · j ∈ Rm ×n j . Similarly it is impossible to compute x j ∈ R n j from x j B · j ∈ R without even knowing B · j . Hence, all entities share the publicly computed linear classifier (7) using AB and x B without revealing either the individual datasets or new point components. The only possibility of information leakage is that incurred if an entity j were to pick for its B · j the identity matrix I or a slight perturbation thereof. However, since B · j is a random matrix, the probability of this happening is zero. Another possible source of leakage could be if entity j were to reveal its random matrix B · j and agree to choosem ≥ n j . Since a basic tenet of our algorithm is not to reveal B · j , this again is extremely improbable. Furthermore, it is impossible to determine whether a component of A · j remains fixed under all transformations without knowing the randomly generated B · j .
We turn now to nonlinear classification. 
NONLINEAR SVM CLASSIfiER FOR VERTICALLY PARTITIONED DATA
The approach to nonlinear classification is similar to that for the linear one, except that we make use of the Hadamard separability of a nonlinear kernel (1) which is satisfied by a Gaussian kernel. Otherwise, the approach is very similar to that of a linear kernel. We state that approach explicitly in Algorithm 3.1.
Remark 3.2. Note that in Algorithm 3.1 no entity j reveals its dataset A · j nor its components of a new data point x j . This is so because it is impossible to compute the mn j numbers constituting A · j ∈ R m×n j given only the mm numbers constituting K (A · j , B · j ) ∈ R m×m and not even knowing B · j ∈ Rm ×n j . Similarly it is impossible to compute x j ∈ R n j from K (x j , B · j ) ∈ R without even knowing B · j . Hence, all entities share the publicly computed nonlinear classifier (11) using K (A, B ) and K (x , B ) without revealing either the individual datasets or new point components. A possible source of leakage could be if entity j were to reveal its random matrix B · j and agree to choosem ≥ n j . Since a basic tenet of our algorithm is not to reveal B · j , this again is extremely improbable.
Before turning to our computational results, it is important to note that Algorithms 2.1 and 3.1 can be used easily with other kernel classification algorithms instead of the 1-norm SVM, including the ordinary 2-norm SVM [Schölkopf and Smola 2002] , the proximal SVM [Fung and Mangasarian 2001a] , and logistic regression [Wahba 1999 ]. [Bennett and Demiriz 1998; Fung and Mangasarian 2001b] .) (II) Each entity generates its own privately held random matrix B · j ∈ Rm ×n j , j = 1, . . . . . . , p, where n j is the number of input features held by entity j . (III) Each entity j makes public its nonlinear kernel K (A · j , B · j ). This does not reveal A · j but allows the public computation of the full nonlinear kernel:
(IV) A publicly calculated linear classifier K (x , B)u − γ = 0 is computed by some standard method such as 1-norm SVM [Mangasarian 2000; Bradley and Mangasarian 1998 ]: min (u,γ , y) ν
(V) For each new x ∈ R n , each entity makes public K (x j , B · j ) from which a public nonlinear classifier is computed as follows: (11) which classifies the given x according to the sign of K (x , B )u − γ . Fig. 1 . Error rate comparison of a 1-norm linear SVM sharing A · j B · j data for each entity versus a 1-norm linear SVM using just the input features A · j of each entity. We compare to both the average error rate of those entities using just the input features, and to a classifier which combines the labels of all the entities by majority vote. Points below the diagonal represent situations in which the error rate for sharing is lower than that for not sharing. Results are given for each dataset with features randomly distributed evenly among 5 entities, and with features randomly distributed so that each entity has about 3 features. The seven datasets given in Table I were used to generate four points each.
It is instructive to compare our proposed privacy-preserving SVM (PPSVM) given in Algorithms 2.1 and 3.1 to other recent work on privacy-preserving classification for vertically partitioned data which also makes use of random matrices. Du et al. [2004] propose a method by which two parties can compute a privacy-preserving linear kernel classifier by securely computing the matrix A A with the use of random matrices. use random matrices to securely compute the full kernel matrix, K (A, A ). Our approach is motivated by the observation that the accuracy of an SVM using a random kernel, K (A, B ) , where B is a completely random matrix, is comparable to the accuracy of an SVM using the full kernel K (A, A ). We provide experimental support for this observation in Section 4. By using K (A, B ) instead of K (A, A ) we are able to obtain an accurate classifier with only very simple, asynchronous communication required among the entities. In other words, each entity j need only broadcast K (A · j , B · j ) to and receive the corresponding message from each of the other entities. In Du et al. [2004] and , synchronized communication steps are needed to securely compute A A or K (A, A ). For example, in , each entity must wait for a message to be passed through each of the other p − 1 entities sequentially to compute K (A, A ). The primary benefit of our approach is simplicity. For example, it is conceptually easy to add or remove entities at any time with our approach. All that is required to add an entity at any point is for the new entity j to make K (A · j , B · j ) available to the other entities, and receive the existing kernel. If an entity needs to be removed, then the remaining entities can recompute the kernel matrix without that entity's contribution. This flexibility is possible because entity j sends K (A · j , B · j ) directly to all the other entities. Another potential benefit is that it seems reasonable to implement our approach in practice without specialized software to coordinate the communication steps, even with large numbers of entities. Furthermore, our approach can be implemented in "parallel" with each entity receiving p − 1 datasets of size m ×m. In contrast, the process in is inherently "serial" because the m ×m perturbed dataset of each entity j must be be processed sequentially by the other p − 1 entities and returned to entity j before that entity can utilize it in its classifier.
We have found that the parallelism in our approach allows entities to compute the kernel matrix faster than the approach of in some circumstances. To test this result, we implemented both approaches to compute the kernel matrix for one entity and tested them on machines in the Computer Systems Lab at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Each entity was run on a randomly selected computer, with no computer running more than one entity. We ran each algorithm with between three and ten entities, using matrices with 1000, 10000, and 100000 elements. Each algorithm was run ten times for each level of entities and matrix size, using ten different randomly selected sets of machines. On average, our approach was more than 2 times as fast as the approach in . In some cases, particularly with smaller matrices, our approach was over 5 times as fast, while for larger matrices our approach Fig. 2 . Error rate comparison of a 1-norm nonlinear SVM sharing K (A · j , B · j ) data for each entity versus a 1-norm nonlinear SVM using just the input features A · j of each entity. We compare to both the average error rate of those entities using just the input features, and to a classifier which combines the labels of all entities by majority vote. Points below the diagonal represent situations in which the error rate for sharing is lower than that for not sharing. Results are given for each dataset with features randomly distributed evenly among 5 entities, and with features randomly distributed so that each entity has about 3 features. The seven datasets given in Table II were used to generate four points each.
tended to be between 0.5 and 1.5 times as fast as , and most often our approach was faster.
We turn now to our computational results.
COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
We illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed privacy-preserving SVM (PPSVM) in two ways. First, we demonstrate that by using our approach entities can obtain classifiers with lower misclassification error than classifiers obtained using only the input features of each entity alone. Second, we show that a random kernel K (A, B ) achieves accuracy comparable to the usual kernel K (A, A ) or the reduced kernel K (A,Ā ). All experiments were run using both a linear kernel and the commonly used Gaussian kernel described in Section 1. In all of our results,Ā consisted of ten percent of the rows of A randomly selected, while B was a completely random matrix of the same size asĀ. Each entry of B was selected from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation one. All datasets were normalized so that each feature had mean zero and standard deviation one. Note that this normalization is carried out for each feature independently, and does not require cooperation among the entities. 
Comparison of Our Approach to Classifiers Obtained Using Only Each Entity's Features
We investigate the benefit of using our PPSVM approach instead of using only the input features available to each entity, using seven datasets from the UCI repository [Murphy and Aha 1992] . To simulate a situation in which each entity has only a subset of the features for each data point, we randomly distribute features among entities such that each entity receives about the same number of features. We chose arbitrarily to perform experiments using five entities for each dataset, and also to perform experiments using whatever number of entities was needed so that each entity received about three features. We also investigate our approach as the number of entities increases on the Ionosphere dataset described in the following and in Figures 3 and 4 . Figure 1 shows results comparing the tenfold cross-validation misclassification error of our linear kernel PPSVM with the average misclassification error of those 1-norm SVM classifiers learned using only the unshared input features available to each entity. Figure 1 also compares our linear kernel PPSVM with the misclassification error of the majority vote of those 1-norm SVM classifiers learned using only the input features available to each entity. We use circles to show how our approach compares to the average error of the entities and triangles to show how our approach compares to the majority vote of the entities. Points below the 45-degree line represent experiments in which our PPSVM has lower error rate than the average error rate of those classifiers learned with only each entity's subset of the features. This indicates that the entities can expect improved performance using PPSVM instead of going it alone. Note that each dataset is represented by four points: one circle and one triangle for the experiment using five entities, and one circle and one triangle for the experiment using a sufficient number of entities so that each entity receives about three features. The results shown in Figure 1 are detailed in Table I . We note that PPSVM obtains classifiers with lower error than the average of those Fig. 5 . Error rate comparison of 1-norm linear SVMs for random kernel versus full and reduced kernels. For points below the diagonal, the random kernel has a lower error rate. The diagonal line in each plot marks equal error rates. One result is given for each dataset in Table I. classifiers using only each entity's features in 11 of 14 experiments, and lower error than the majority vote of classifiers using only each entity's features in 13 of 14 experiments. The parameter ν was selected from {10 i |i = −7, . . . , 7} for each dataset using a random ten percent of each training set as a tuning set. Figure 2 shows results for similar experiments using Gaussian kernels, with details in given Table II. We used the same datasets as for the experiments described earlier. To save time, we used the tuning strategy described in Huang et al. [2007] . In this nested uniform design approach, rather than evaluating a classifier at each point of a grid in the parameter space, the classifier is evaluated only at a set of points; this set is designed to "cover" the original grid to the extent possible. The point from this smaller set on which the classifier does best is then made the center of a grid which covers a smaller range of parameter space, and the process is repeated. Huang et al. [2007] demonstrate empirically that this approach finds classifiers with similar misclassification error as a brute-force search through the entire grid. We set the initial range of log 10 ν to [−7, 7] , and the initial range of log 10 μ as described in Huang et al. [2007] . We used a uniform design with 30 runs from http://www.math.hkbu.edu.hk/UniformDesign for both nestings, and used fivefold cross-validation on the training set to evaluate each (ν, μ) pair.
We further explore the behavior of our approach as the number of entities changes on the Ionosphere dataset. Figure 3 shows the difference in misclassification error rates as the number of entities varies according to {2, 4, . . . , 30}. For Fig. 6 . Error rate comparison of 1-norm nonlinear SVM for random kernel versus full and reduced kernels. For points below the diagonal, the random kernel has a lower error rate. The diagonal line in each plot marks equal error rates. One result is given for each dataset in Table II. each number of entities, a box-and-whisker plot is given which shows the median (represented by a dot), interquartile range (the space between the dot and the vertical lines), and data range (the vertical lines) with outliers removed for each fold of tenfold cross-validation for all the entities. Note that as the number of entities increases, our PPSVM approach tends to have better median error rates, and that more observations favor PPSVM as more of the data lies above the y = 0 axis. The results shown in Figure 3 indicate that as each entity has fewer features, greater improvement due to using PPSVM would be expected, and also that some improvement is more likely to be observed. Figure 4 shows similar results using a Gaussian kernel. Each experiment was tuned according to the procedures for linear and nonlinear kernels described previously.
Comparison of a Random Kernel to Full and Reduced Kernels
To justify the use of a random kernel we compare the performance of our PPSVM (Algorithms 2.1 and 3.1) with both an ordinary 1-norm SVM using a full kernel matrix and a 1-norm SVM using a reduced kernel matrix (RSVM) [Lee and Mangasarian 2001] . Figure 5 shows scatterplots comparing the error rates of our PPSVM with 1-norm SVM and PPSVM with RSVM, all using linear kernels. Note that points close to the 45-degree line represent datasets for which the classifiers being compared have similar error rates. All error rates were obtained using the procedure described before for linear kernels, and the datasets used are those in Table I . Figure 6 shows similar results using a Gaussian kernel.
All error rates were obtained using the same procedures and datasets as those in Table II , described before. We note that the misclassification error for our PPSVM approach is comparable to those of 1-norm SVM and RSVM using both linear and Gaussian kernels.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
We have proposed a linear and nonlinear privacy-preserving SVM classifier based on a privately generated and privately held random matrix by each entity. Each entity possesses a different set of input features, which are used collectively to generate the SVM classifier. The proposed approach uses all privately held data in a form that does not reveal what this data is. Computational comparisons indicate that the accuracy of our proposed approach is comparable to full and reduced data classifiers. Furthermore, a marked improvement in accuracy is obtained by the privacy-preserving SVM as compared to classifiers generated by each entity using its own data alone. Hence, by making use of a random kernel, the proposed approach succeeds in generating an accurate classifier based on privately held data without revealing any of that data.
Future work for horizontally partitioned data (wherein each entity possesses all of the same input features, but for different individuals) can be treated in a similar manner and will be described in a forthcoming article [Mangasarian and Wild 2007] .
